In a terminal, install now says which peers it waits for and that Enter
skips the wait; Enter ends it at once and names the peers not back yet.
-no-wait skips it in scripts. Without a terminal and without -no-wait,
install still waits up to 30 s. The takeover is done before the wait
starts, so skipping it changes nothing on the server.
On a server running pivpn's WireGuard, a new install offers to take it
over: the server key, port, MTU, tunnel networks, endpoint, DNS,
AllowedIPs and keepalive, and every client with its public key,
preshared key and addresses. Devices keep their configs. Clients pivpn
switched off are imported switched off, with the note "Imported from
pivpn". Client private keys in /etc/wireguard/configs are not read.
- Install notes which peers are connected, stops wg-quick@wg0, starts
GHOSTWIRE on the same wg0 and waits up to 30 s for those peers. The
wait only reports; idle devices reconnect when they next send.
- If the service does not stay running, install removes what it set up,
including config.json, and starts pivpn's WireGuard again.
- Without a terminal the takeover needs -import-pivpn; install refuses
to run next to pivpn otherwise, and the flag is refused on an
existing install.
- Names GHOSTWIRE does not accept are renamed and listed in the
summary. An IPv6 address that differs from the mapped one is kept on
the peer until its config is issued again.
- uninstall without a config of its own (e.g. after a takeover was
undone) leaves the WireGuard interface alone and removes only the
firewall table.
- README: "Coming from pivpn?" under the intro, a Features entry and a
"Moving from pivpn" section.
Tested end to end on Ubuntu 24.04 with pivpn aa96de7.
Settings -> Upkeep -> Backup & restore lists the config.json.bak-* files
that update leaves behind and removes one or all of them; they hold the
same secrets as a backup. Removing needs a signed-in user and is logged.
After a successful update only the newest 3 copies are kept, and a copy
that would overwrite an older one (version unknown, or the same version
twice) gets the time appended. The backup card now also names preshared
keys and authenticator app secrets.
The update notice uses the existing compareVersions instead of its own.
With net.ipv6.conf.all.forwarding=1, Linux ignores router announcements
unless accept_ra is 2, so a server that gets its IPv6 route by SLAAC
(e.g. a Raspberry Pi at home) lost IPv6 once the route expired.
The sysctl file now also sets accept_ra=2 for the default and for every
network card and the IPv6 default-route interface, except where
accept_ra is 0. "update" rewrites the file, which fixes existing
installs. A new health check warns while the uplink still has
accept_ra=1.
The single admin account becomes a list of users; config.json moves to
version 2 and the old admin is migrated on first start. Every user is an
admin. Sessions are tied to a user and their password, so deleting a user
or resetting a password signs them out at once. API tokens belong to the
user who made them and go away with that user.
Admins add users with a temporary password and choose whether it must be
changed at first sign-in; until then the API refuses everything but the
password change. Settings gets My account and Users cards, and the token
table shows each token's owner. 'GHOSTWIRE passwd [username]' resets any
user's password. A failed update now also restores config.json, since the
new version may have upgraded it.
In a terminal, install now asks for the domain, Let's Encrypt email,
endpoint, WireGuard port and admin password, shows a summary and changes
nothing until confirmed. Re-runs offer the current settings and say how
many devices need a new config when the endpoint or port changes.
Flags still work and skip their question; -y or no terminal skips all
questions. New -port flag sets the WireGuard UDP port. Every value is
checked before the system is touched.
Single Go binary that manages a WireGuard server based on pivpn's defaults:
- config.json as the single source of truth, reconciled to the kernel via
netlink, wgctrl and its own nftables table (NAT, forward, input)
- web interface (dashboard, peers, peer detail, add peer, server, settings)
and a JSON API for the future iOS app, with session and API-token auth
- client private keys are never stored; configs and QR codes shown once
- per-peer traffic statistics in stats.json, logs in GHOSTWIRE.jsonl
- HTTPS via Let's Encrypt, self-signed, certificate files or off
- self-managing: install, update (restores the old binary on failure),
uninstall and passwd subcommands; systemd unit generated by the binary
Tested end to end on Ubuntu 26.04 (kernel 7.0) at dev.redetzke.aero.