GHOSTWIRE 0.1.2: WireGuard server manager with web UI and API

Single Go binary that manages a WireGuard server based on pivpn's defaults:
- config.json as the single source of truth, reconciled to the kernel via
  netlink, wgctrl and its own nftables table (NAT, forward, input)
- web interface (dashboard, peers, peer detail, add peer, server, settings)
  and a JSON API for the future iOS app, with session and API-token auth
- client private keys are never stored; configs and QR codes shown once
- per-peer traffic statistics in stats.json, logs in GHOSTWIRE.jsonl
- HTTPS via Let's Encrypt, self-signed, certificate files or off
- self-managing: install, update (restores the old binary on failure),
  uninstall and passwd subcommands; systemd unit generated by the binary

Tested end to end on Ubuntu 26.04 (kernel 7.0) at dev.redetzke.aero.

Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01RAnLbyQZ5ZTA7KqwXP98nw
This commit is contained in:
Daniel Redetzke
2026-10-03 16:54:37 +03:00
commit 4793e8dfba
25 changed files with 6213 additions and 0 deletions
+262
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package main
import (
"crypto/rand"
"crypto/sha256"
"crypto/subtle"
"encoding/base64"
"encoding/hex"
"errors"
"fmt"
"net"
"net/http"
"strings"
"sync"
"time"
"golang.org/x/crypto/argon2"
)
// --- passwords (argon2id, PHC string format) ---
const (
argonTime = 3
argonMemory = 64 * 1024
argonThreads = 2
argonKeyLen = 32
)
func hashPassword(pw string) (string, error) {
salt := make([]byte, 16)
if _, err := rand.Read(salt); err != nil {
return "", err
}
key := argon2.IDKey([]byte(pw), salt, argonTime, argonMemory, argonThreads, argonKeyLen)
b64 := base64.RawStdEncoding
return fmt.Sprintf("$argon2id$v=%d$m=%d,t=%d,p=%d$%s$%s",
argon2.Version, argonMemory, argonTime, argonThreads, b64.EncodeToString(salt), b64.EncodeToString(key)), nil
}
func verifyPassword(encoded, pw string) bool {
parts := strings.Split(encoded, "$")
if len(parts) != 6 || parts[1] != "argon2id" {
return false
}
var m uint32
var t uint32
var p uint8
if _, err := fmt.Sscanf(parts[3], "m=%d,t=%d,p=%d", &m, &t, &p); err != nil {
return false
}
b64 := base64.RawStdEncoding
salt, err1 := b64.DecodeString(parts[4])
want, err2 := b64.DecodeString(parts[5])
if err1 != nil || err2 != nil {
return false
}
got := argon2.IDKey([]byte(pw), salt, t, m, p, uint32(len(want)))
return subtle.ConstantTimeCompare(got, want) == 1
}
func validatePassword(pw string) error {
if len([]rune(pw)) < 12 {
return badRequest("password must be at least 12 characters")
}
return nil
}
// --- random secrets ---
func randomString(n int) string {
b := make([]byte, n)
if _, err := rand.Read(b); err != nil {
panic(err)
}
return base64.RawURLEncoding.EncodeToString(b)
}
func newID() string {
b := make([]byte, 16)
_, _ = rand.Read(b)
b[6] = b[6]&0x0f | 0x40
b[8] = b[8]&0x3f | 0x80
h := hex.EncodeToString(b)
return h[0:8] + "-" + h[8:12] + "-" + h[12:16] + "-" + h[16:20] + "-" + h[20:]
}
const tokenPrefix = "wgt_"
func hashToken(tok string) string {
sum := sha256.Sum256([]byte(tok))
return "sha256:" + hex.EncodeToString(sum[:])
}
// --- sessions, token use and login throttling (in memory) ---
type principal struct {
Name string // "admin" or the token name
Scope string // rw | ro
TokenID string
IsAdmin bool
RemoteIP string
}
type session struct {
user string
expires time.Time
}
type tokenUse struct {
At time.Time `json:"at"`
IP string `json:"ip"`
}
type failState struct {
count int
until time.Time
}
type Auth struct {
store *Store
mu sync.Mutex
sessions map[string]*session
used map[string]tokenUse
fails map[string]*failState
}
const (
maxFailures = 5
lockoutTime = 15 * time.Minute
)
func newAuth(s *Store) *Auth {
return &Auth{store: s, sessions: map[string]*session{}, used: map[string]tokenUse{}, fails: map[string]*failState{}}
}
func cookieName() string { return appName + "_session" }
var errLocked = errors.New("too many failed attempts, try again later")
// Login checks the credentials and returns a new session id.
func (a *Auth) Login(user, pw, ip string) (string, error) {
a.mu.Lock()
f := a.fails[ip]
if f != nil && time.Now().Before(f.until) {
a.mu.Unlock()
return "", errLocked
}
a.mu.Unlock()
cfg := a.store.Get()
if cfg.Admin.PasswordHash == "" {
return "", errors.New("no admin password is set; run: " + appName + " -passwd")
}
okUser := subtle.ConstantTimeCompare([]byte(user), []byte(cfg.Admin.Username)) == 1
okPw := verifyPassword(cfg.Admin.PasswordHash, pw)
a.mu.Lock()
defer a.mu.Unlock()
if !okUser || !okPw {
if f == nil {
f = &failState{}
a.fails[ip] = f
}
f.count++
if f.count >= maxFailures {
f.count = 0
f.until = time.Now().Add(lockoutTime)
}
return "", errors.New("wrong username or password")
}
delete(a.fails, ip)
id := randomString(32)
a.sessions[id] = &session{user: cfg.Admin.Username, expires: time.Now().Add(time.Duration(cfg.Web.SessionHours) * time.Hour)}
return id, nil
}
func (a *Auth) Logout(id string) {
a.mu.Lock()
delete(a.sessions, id)
a.mu.Unlock()
}
// DropSessions signs everyone out, e.g. after a password change.
func (a *Auth) DropSessions() {
a.mu.Lock()
a.sessions = map[string]*session{}
a.mu.Unlock()
}
func remoteIP(r *http.Request) string {
host, _, err := net.SplitHostPort(r.RemoteAddr)
if err != nil {
host = r.RemoteAddr
}
// Behind a local reverse proxy the real client is in X-Forwarded-For.
if ip := net.ParseIP(host); ip != nil && ip.IsLoopback() {
if xff := r.Header.Get("X-Forwarded-For"); xff != "" {
return strings.TrimSpace(strings.Split(xff, ",")[0])
}
}
return host
}
// Authenticate accepts a session cookie or "Authorization: Bearer wgt_...".
func (a *Auth) Authenticate(r *http.Request) (*principal, bool) {
ip := remoteIP(r)
if h := r.Header.Get("Authorization"); strings.HasPrefix(h, "Bearer ") {
tok := strings.TrimSpace(strings.TrimPrefix(h, "Bearer "))
if !strings.HasPrefix(tok, tokenPrefix) {
return nil, false
}
want := hashToken(tok)
for _, t := range a.store.Get().APITokens {
if subtle.ConstantTimeCompare([]byte(t.Hash), []byte(want)) == 1 {
a.mu.Lock()
a.used[t.ID] = tokenUse{At: time.Now(), IP: ip}
a.mu.Unlock()
return &principal{Name: t.Name, Scope: t.Scope, TokenID: t.ID, RemoteIP: ip}, true
}
}
return nil, false
}
c, err := r.Cookie(cookieName())
if err != nil {
return nil, false
}
a.mu.Lock()
defer a.mu.Unlock()
s := a.sessions[c.Value]
if s == nil || time.Now().After(s.expires) {
delete(a.sessions, c.Value)
return nil, false
}
return &principal{Name: s.user, Scope: "rw", IsAdmin: true, RemoteIP: ip}, true
}
func (a *Auth) TokenUse(id string) *tokenUse {
a.mu.Lock()
defer a.mu.Unlock()
if u, ok := a.used[id]; ok {
return &u
}
return nil
}
// sweep removes expired sessions and stale lockouts.
func (a *Auth) sweep() {
a.mu.Lock()
defer a.mu.Unlock()
now := time.Now()
for id, s := range a.sessions {
if now.After(s.expires) {
delete(a.sessions, id)
}
}
for ip, f := range a.fails {
if now.After(f.until) && f.count == 0 {
delete(a.fails, ip)
}
}
}