Fixes from the audit: input checks, apply order, sign-in limits

- The server endpoint must be a plain host name or IP address. It is
  written into client configs as is, so a newline could add lines such
  as PreUp, which wg-quick runs as root on the client.
- Listen addresses and the session length (1–720 hours) are checked.
  Before web settings or a restore are saved, the server tries the new
  listen addresses and certificate files, so a value it cannot start
  with is refused instead of stopping the service at the next restart.
- Kernel applies run one at a time and read the config once it is
  their turn, so an older config can no longer be applied last.
- Pending passkey sign-ins are capped: 10 per address, 1000 in total.
- Behind a local proxy, the last X-Forwarded-For entry is the client;
  earlier ones come from the client and are ignored.
- With LAN access off, peers are also kept from the IPv6 networks on
  the uplink, not only from its private IPv4 networks.
- A change that leaves no user with a password is refused, and so is a
  backup without one or from a newer version.

auth.go

@@ -287,9 +287,14 @@ func remoteIP(r *http.Request) string {
 		host = r.RemoteAddr
 	}
 	// Behind a local reverse proxy the real client is in X-Forwarded-For.
+	// The proxy appends the address it saw, so only the last entry counts:
+	// earlier ones come from the client and can be anything.
 	if ip := net.ParseIP(host); ip != nil && ip.IsLoopback() {
-		if xff := r.Header.Get("X-Forwarded-For"); xff != "" {
-			return strings.TrimSpace(strings.Split(xff, ",")[0])
+		if xff := r.Header.Values("X-Forwarded-For"); len(xff) > 0 {
+			list := strings.Split(xff[len(xff)-1], ",")
+			if last := strings.TrimSpace(list[len(list)-1]); net.ParseIP(last) != nil {
+				return last
+			}
 		}
 	}
 	return host